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Abstract: I argue in this article that people in prison make excellent philosophers, for rea-
sons related to what they are deprived of. I also suggest that great novels constitute, or at the 
very least, introduce us to, philosophy. Some of the deepest questions about human life can be 
addressed by fusing philosophical thinking with empirical research in prisons. Prisoners talk 
with depth and insight about what it is to feel human, what matters most in human experience, 
and the importance of the ‘vibrations of fellow feeling’. 
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Introduction
The core ethical question becomes how human relations can expand and em-
power individuals’ capacities, instead of diminishing them (Carlisle, 2019, pp. 
45-46, on Spinoza).
As George Eliot, she would see her work as a novelist as “unravelling” … the 
“mystery” of moral life (Carlisle, 2019, p. 33).
How do we find our bearings in this complex and turbulent life? What kinds of encoun-
ters and relationships expand or diminish our capacities? What if answers to these questions 
can be found by fusing philosophical thinking with empirical research? Abstract ideas must ap-
ply to real, complex lives if they are to have meaning and value. Philosophical novelists labour 
in this territory, putting ideas to work in their depictions of common human struggles. Their 
ideas derive from many sources, so they are digested and developed, rather than translated, 
with empathy and imagination (see Gatens, 2019). I witnessed the relevance of philosophical 
ideas in the real world in my work, doing applied research, in prisons. Something about investi-
gating prison suicide and suicide attempts made concepts of meaning and survivability critical. 
I found, in brief, that suicides are more likely in dehumanising prisons (Liebling, 2006). The 
very word dehumanising denotes a denial of our human-ness, raising key questions about what 
that human-ness is. Prisoners talk with depth and insight about what it is to feel human, as I 
illustrate below. I argue in this article that people in prison make excellent philosophers, for 
reasons related to what they are deprived of. I also suggest that great novels constitute, or at the 
very least, introduce us to, philosophy. Inevitably, then, I suggest that teaching philosophy in 
prison is a deeply valuable and meaningful exercise. Others are beginning to make this case in 
interesting and convincing ways (Szifris, 2021; West, 2022).
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My interest in philosophy developed out of a love of literature, although I barely no-
ticed the philosophers’ voices in the novels of Eliot, Camus, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy when 
I first read them. I appreciated the fact that these novelists were great moral thinkers, but that 
recognition was latent and subdued. My response to their writing was emotional: I fell in love. 
This made me love life which – as a troubled teenager – was significant. If ‘philosophy arises 
naturally out of the human condition’ (Nagel, 1989), then literature provided deep and compel-
ling accounts of that human condition in all its tragedy and complexity. Later, I found political 
philosophy by far the most intellectually exciting part of my politics degree. Moral philosophy 
eventually became an important companion in my search, with others, to conceptualise and 
measure the quality of prison life. We were trying to do justice to concepts that matter, and 
to understand, as precisely as we could, how these concepts-in-action were relevant to human 
experience. Philosophy is, after all, ‘a subject that gets right to the heart of what matters’ 
(Warburton, 2021). I noticed early on that prisoners got to the heart of the matter rather easily 
(Liebling, with Arnold, 2004).
Philosophical ideas helped make sense of what the data kept showing over a profes-
sional lifetime of prisons research: that what helps us to survive and flourish are ‘the virtues’: 
kindness, relationships with others, respect and recognition, trust, and a legitimate form of 
order. This is demonstrated starkly in prison, for reasons I outline below, but it is (I, and others 
claim) also true in general. George Eliot was my favourite author, and now (in a project that is 
ongoing) I have the luxury of working out how uncannily her ideas and my prisons research 
data coincide. As Philip Davis (2017a), her intellectual biographer, said:
‘If you want to read literature that sets out to create a holding ground for raw 
human material—for human struggles, difficulties, and celebrations—read 
George Eliot’.
The key novels for me were Mill on the Floss, Adam Bede, Scenes of Clerical Life, Daniel 
Deronda and Middlemarch, of which Philip Davis says:
You’ve got the most powerful working model in fiction of what human life 
is like. It’s as if somehow George Eliot has found the building blocks—the 
DNA—of existence (2017a).
In George Eliot’s case, each novel constitutes a demonstration of her synthetic philosophical 
thinking: that human relationships have causal effects, that our minds have a huge capacity to 
be affected by relations with others; and that they are almost ‘sacred’ in their significance: what 
Clare Carlisle calls ‘a philosophy of encounter and transformation’ (2019, p. 601). This ‘truth’ 
has emerged in every research project I have carried out, as long as I stayed as close as possible 
to feeling and experience: I learned that human vibrations really matter in prison. This insight 
lies at the heart of George Eliot’s humanistic philosophy.
George Eliot’s thinking had been shaped by her translations, and therefore close read-
ings of, the works of Strauss, Feuerbach and Spinoza, as well as other great thinkers of her 
time. Through her translations of their ideas, and their carefully constructed presentations in 
literature (‘experiments in life’), she made them relevant. These philosophers of human ex-
perience help explain what makes most prison environments barely survivable, but also what 
makes a few, manageable. We need respect, recognition, kindness, order and justice like we 
need oxygen (but we need to be precise about the meaning-in-practice of these words). Return-
ing to George Eliot, and the writers who influenced her, is helping me to organise ongoing em-
pirical work ‘in the service of human life’ (Davis, 2017b). The ideas were there all along, but 
carefully collected empirical data supports them. I illustrate this with some examples below. 
There are four dimensions to this relationship between George Eliot’s work and find-
ings from prisons research that I want to touch on in this article:
1. George Eliot’s language, and understanding, of ‘the vibrations of fellow feeling’;
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2. Her linking of the abstract with the concrete; of truth residing in individual lives;
3. Her concept of the fundamental, and the links between the grasping of this moral 
impulse, or the existential force of morality, and the experience of loss; and
4. Her concept of authentic description and its moral purpose.
I will address each of these briefly.
1. The Vibrations of Fellow Feeling
In an early study of the work of prison officers and their relationships with prisoners a colleague 
and I described a typical disciplinary hearing (known as an adjudication), in a well-functioning 
prison. We said:
During adjudications we sometimes witnessed a kind of ‘togetherness’ as 
staff and prisoners responded – knowing the full implications – to a verdict or 
award of the adjudicating governor. (Liebling & Price, 1999, p. 16)
This was a ‘meeting’ – a scene in the intimate dynamics of power and exchange that take place 
routinely, though very differently, in prison. When they work well, officers recognise prisoners, 
feel their moods, and understand the impact of decisions on them. Good prison officers adjust 
their behaviour accordingly, using discretion, and mercy, judiciously. What George Eliot calls 
the ‘vibrations of fellow feeling’, which are inseparable from uses of power in prison, keep 
people alive. She says …‘It is like a diffusion or expansion of one’s own life, to be assured 
that its vibrations are repeated in another … ’ (Haight, 1954, in Davis, 2017a, p. 55). Human 
vibrations are a kind of ‘responsive action’, the presence of a soul, reverberating in sympathy to 
another soul. When a prison officer says, ‘put the knife down mate; just put it down’, the officer 
is drawing on knowledge acquired over time; seeds sown in social exchanges on and off the 
wing, the translation across differences into meaningful communication, acknowledgement or 
connection. He is present (it was a ‘he’ in this case). When this works, the miracle of order – a 
normative order – can be created on a wing (Liebling et al., 2010). When it fails, as it so often 
does, a spiral of antagonism, instability and despair follows. The contrast between ‘meetings’ 
and ‘un-meetings’ (see Buber’s I-It, I-Thou distinction, 2010), or presence and absence as col-
leagues and I have described it, makes up much of the ‘syntax of power’ in prison (see Crewe et 
al., 2014). The difference makes a prison ‘survivable’ or not survivable. This is a kind of moral 
grammar of our existence. As Buber put it, ‘All actual life is encounter’ (see Kramer, 2003, p. 
21).1 What is illustrated in George Eliot’s fiction, grounded in the abstract philosophy of her 
favourite thinkers, is acutely evident in prison. People only want to go on living when those 
around them treat them carefully (see, e.g. Liebling, 1992, 1999b). This is why power only 
works effectively, or legitimately, through relationships (see Liebling, 2000, 2011). Without 
regard we resist and rebel, or we perish.
2. The Abstract and the Concrete
My next point flows from the first and is about Eliot’s linking of the abstract with the concrete; 
of truth residing in individual lives. Below are two quotations from prisoners describing their 
experience to illustrate this. The first is talking about his experience of disrespect, when he 
arrived in prison. He says:
When I first came in, I had no pillow. I approached two officers – they were 
chatting, so I waited. Eventually, one of them asked me what I wanted. He 
said, ‘You’re not entitled to a pillow’ and carried on chatting. They were not 
concerned about me. That seems minor, but it’s crucial. It can turn you into a 
different person. (Prisoner, in Liebling, with Arnold, 2004)
This second describes its opposite: respect.
1 This is also translated as ‘All real living is meeting’. The essence of this idea is that so much of what goes on 
in human life occurs in the sphere of ‘between’ (see Buber, 1938). Buber was, like Eliot, inspired by Feuerbach.
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Respect, right? It’s something about what I was saying with that cup of tea. An 
officer got me a cup of water at lock up so I could make myself one. Someone 
wanted to recognise that I’m a person. Do you know what I mean? (Prisoner)
The second participant identifies, phenomenologically, the content and importance of recogni-
tion to his well-being. Both get to the heart of the link between interpersonal treatment and the 
‘expanding or contracting of a life’ (Davis, 2017b, p. 116) which takes place according to the 
ethical space around it. What is important here (and has emerged over and again in my work) 
is that prisons differ morally, so we can explore these differences systematically. The life force 
is made visible – we can see it striving, failing, being supported or devastated in a measurable 
environment. Prisons provide us with ‘felt ethics over theoretic politics’ (Davis, p. 101) and 
with a direct route to moral concepts (like justice, dignity and recognition) in action. Apparent-
ly abstract norms can be recognized ‘acting’ in ordinary persons. Human beings ‘shrink’ and 
‘contract’ ‘like a nervous organism diminishing its life’ when they are treated with indifference, 
carelessness or brutality (Davis, 2017b, pp. 202–204; and see Porporino, 2010). They survive, 
or grow and flourish, when they are treated decently. 
Looking at the results from our ‘moral climate surveys’ (see further Liebling, 2012; 
Liebling et al., 2011) – which we developed using a methodology I refer to as ‘ethnography-led 
measurement’ – we find that indifferent, aggressive or unfair treatment can lead to higher levels 
of ‘political charge’ – anger and alienation as well as suicide and violence. Radicalization in 
prison is rare, but it becomes more likely where prisons look like ‘failed states’: where power 
works in illegitimate ways, moral vacuums arise, chaos and disorganisation exit (see Williams 
& Liebling, submitted). On the other hand, and here I am summarizing large and separate 
studies, exceptional, person-centred prisons in which justice and love can be found lead to bet-
ter outcomes on all measures, including reconviction (Auty & Liebling, 2019). In the human 
struggle for life, mistreatment is toxic. We have strong evidence that the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ are 
fused; moral facts are ‘embedded in the substance of the social’ (Fassin, 2015, p. 4).2
Because of the controlled nature of the environment, and because of its moral intensity, 
the particular and ‘the real’ are highly visible and can be linked to the general. We can ‘think 
within the subject’ rather than about it and observe ‘the order and connection of things’, as 
Spinoza and Durkheim proposed. We find, at least in prison, that there are moral rules in the 
universe – that the essence of life is ‘almost sacred’ (Davis, 2017b), but the source of the almost 
sacredness is our selves (see also Scruton, 2014; Williams, 2018).
3. George Eliot’s Concept of the Fundamental
For the third point, I want to use a quote, from Janet’s Repentance:
Within the four walls where the stir and glare of the world are shut out, and 
every voice is subdued – where a human being lies prostrate, thrown on the 
tender mercies of his fellow, the moral relation of man to man is reduced to 
its utmost clearness and simplicity: bigotry cannot confuse it, theory cannot 
pervert it, passion, awed into quiescence, can neither pollute nor perturb it. As 
we bend over the sick-bed, all the forces of our nature rush towards the chan-
nels of pity, of patience, and of love, and sweep down the miserable choking 
drift of our quarrels, our debates, our would-be wisdom, and our clamorous 
selfish desires. This blessing of serene freedom from the importunities of opin-
ion lies in all simple direct acts of mercy, and is often one source of that sweet 
calm which is often felt by the watcher in the sick room, even when the duties 
are of a hard and terrible kind. (Ch. 24, p. 308: emphasis added)
2 I mean ‘moral facts’ as patterned, observable moral concepts that have explanatory significance: a 
form of naturalistic realism: if something is part of a genuine explanation of facts, it is appropriate to 
regard it as real (Sturgeon ,1985; Durkheim, 1893/2013). I am grateful to Jonathan Jacobs for continuing 
dialogue on this point. Fassin used the term ‘questions’, rather than facts, in his essay.
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In the sick room, ‘near its end, human life [is] at its most minimal and yet fundamental’ … 
Human beings encounter ‘the revelation of an irreducible, overwhelmingly primary reality’ 
(Davis, 2017b, p. 74). The basic moral grammar of humankind erupts ‘beyond the to-ing and 
fro-ing of intellectual doubt’ (p. 75). ‘This was overwhelmingly the thing itself’; human values, 
or virtues – ‘primitive love’ and ‘the need to be merciful or to receive mercy’ - become less 
uncertain or disguised from us; they have an existential force at the end of life. It is an almost 
religious feeling. What she says here, I had just experienced at my Father’s bedside. But I had 
also felt this for thirty years in prison.
Prisons, I realized, are, ‘next only to death’, using the term used by Sean McConville 
for the title of his book about English Local Prisons (1995) in their capacity to concentrate the 
mind on what it is to be human. Paradoxically, because of what they make so rare (freedom, 
love, and dignity), they are uniquely amenable settings for locating the fundamental. Imagine 
for a moment the experience of being given a life sentence with a tariff of 35 years at the age 
of 18. This has become increasingly the case as the common law of joint enterprise has been 
used to hold all of those at the scene, and sometimes beyond, responsible for knife crimes, for 
example (Crewe et al., 2016; Hulley et al., 2019). The existential challenge for prisoners facing 
such sentences are extraordinary. ‘For the first few years’, said one, ‘I was struggling with my 
emotions’ (in Liebling et al., 2011).
Once they emerge from the early stages of their catastrophic, ‘life-trashing’ sentences 
(Simon, 2001), prisoners become the ‘unlikely representatives of the primary … and the funda-
mental’ (Davis, 2017b, p. 194) articulating, or making detectable, ‘the real’. The ‘raw material 
of moral sentiment’ (George Eliot Essays, p. 270, in Davis, 2017b, p. 201) is everywhere: the 
‘right thing’ being felt, and expressed, in ‘the wrong place’ (Ibid, p. 202).
Counter-intuitively, being in, or even going to, a prison wakes up our moral imagina-
tion. There are good reasons for this. Prisoners talk with passion and clarity about ‘things that 
matter’. Existential questions become hard to avoid. There is a moral intensity to prison life, 
which is linked to the fact that they are places full of power and deprivation. Prisoners experi-
ence intense emotional responses to both. Patterns are discernible that make clear what is real 
and important about human social and moral life. Morality has ‘an existential force’ (p. 362) 
in places that feel like hell (Midgley, 2005) or where ‘death, suffering and misery’ are found 
(Monk, 1991, p. 137). Prisoners ‘know’ things, about sorrow, regret, abandonment, unfairness, 
violence, loneliness, humanity, and the significance of mercy. We know that suffering and the 
‘acquisition of knowledge’ are often linked (Davis 2017a, p. 393). Imprisonment can force a 
realization of what is meaningful, or of what matters. Human needs are ‘wrought back’ into 
feeling, both as a result of ‘the crisis event’ – or deprivation of liberty – and because of the 
exposure to intensified or power-infused forms of interaction on a day-to-day basis. Suffering 
subtracts from and diminishes life, but it can reveal what it is that is lacking, or precipitate the 
struggle for life. 
Paradoxically, this is where ‘the living energy’ or the pulse of life is at its most pow-
erful. It becomes especially clear when a felt ‘lack’ of, for example, humanity, is momentarily 
relieved. Extreme contrast (absence and presence) makes the prison something like a ‘moral 
laboratory’ in which what matters comes clear, prisoners can help us to conceptualize and, 
in the end, measure this, and once we have done so, variations between establishments with 
different moral climates and practices are found to be clearly linked to ‘survival’ and other 
important outcomes. Of course, not all prisoners are opened up by the experience of imprison-
ment. This is linked to the fact that the opportunities available, as well as the social and moral 
climates, differ significantly, as do prisoners’ characters and emotional lives. Some harden and 
narrow, or are otherwise diminished and damaged, by imprisonment. I describe possibilities 
grounded in experience here, arguing that it is important to understand the differences between 
expansive/empowering environments and destructive ones. These differences, as both Spinoza 
and Eliot would argue, tend to be relational (see Auty & Liebling, 2019). Survivable prisons 
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are characterized by higher levels of mercy, kindness, humanity and respect (but also fairness, 
clarity and safety) than unsurvivable prisons. My work diagnoses prisons culturally and moral-
ly, and this is what we have found (Liebling, with Arnold, 2004).
4. Authentic Description and its Moral Purpose.
The final point I want to make here is about authentic description. I have written about 
this before, drawing on George Eliot (Liebling, 1999a) but have come to understand the signif-
icance of ‘faithful representation’ more deeply following a return research exercise in a prison I 
had once known very well. Ten years after I had first studied it, it was changed. For all sorts of 
reasons, trust had stopped flowing, and the opposite scenario from the adjudication I described 
earlier had become the norm. Prisoners and staff were distant, and meaningful communica-
tion had ceased. The prison was dangerously violent. It was very difficult to get people to talk 
openly about what was going on. We (a team of three) spent 18 months trying to get under the 
surface, and then we wrote a report (Liebling et al., 2011). Everybody misunderstood every-
body else. We described the prison as ‘paralysed by distrust’. The research task of ‘getting the 
description right’ was getting harder, but so was the work task of creating a normative order 
in which ‘meetings’ between whole persons were possible. This was a post 9/11 high security 
prison; 40 per cent of its prisoners were Muslim. Half of that number had converted to Islam in 
prison. Fear and risk permeated the atmosphere. No-one was willing to ‘name the elephant in 
the room’ or talk about what was going on (Liebling, 2011, 2015a). Un-meetings and failures 
of seeing were creating violence. That fuller story is still to be written; the point here is how 
right George Eliot was that the very difficult task of ‘faithful representation’ has a deep moral 
purpose.
Philosopher Iris Murdoch captures this problem and all that is at stake here:
For Murdoch, the most crucial moral virtue was a kind of attentiveness to 
detail, a wise, trained capacity for vision, which could see what was really 
going on in a situation and respond accordingly ... For Murdoch, what so often 
keeps us from acting morally is not that we fail to follow the moral rules that 
tell us how to act; rather, it is that we misunderstand the situation before us 
[emphasis added]. When we describe the situation to ourselves, we simply get 
it wrong. (Jollimore, 2013, paras 16, 17)
As Eliot argued, the task of art and writing is ‘to enlarge the sympathies of others’; to under-
stand, but also to promote understanding. She said:
‘the only effect I ardently long to produce by my writings, is that those who 
read them should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains and joys of 
those who differ from themselves in everything but the broad fact of being 
struggling, erring human creatures’. (Haight, 1954, The George Eliot Letters: 
III, 111. 5 July 1859)
What Eliot called ‘authentic representation’ is something which has a moral value. 
It reminds us of the reality and dignity of all people, enlarging our sympathies and teaching 
through the experience of others. Enduring truths are based on real human feeling and experi-
ence.
The aim of prison scholarship, I argue, is authentic description; ‘to make the prison 
world “intelligible”; to make moral blindness less likely or possible’ … and ‘to enlarge sympa-
thies in ways that can reshape human consciousness and with it the structures of society’ (Li-
ebling, 2015b, p. 30). We should try to be George Eliot in prison.
I argue in my work that what happens in prison can be seen as an intensified and highly 
visible version of what happens in human social environments more generally: the ways in 
which power flows and interpersonal relationships function shape outcomes. Order, safety, sur-
vival, and growth, in and out of prison, depend largely on what goes on between people. Like 
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human beings more generally, but in ways that can be clearly witnessed and described, prison-
ers need help, love and recognition if they are to ‘go on’. Lying at the intersection between the 
empirical, the normative and the conceptual, we find that human beings ‘shrink’ or they survive 
and or grow, according to the human vibrations around them – we come as close to the ‘sources 
of the basically human’ as it is possible to be. 
My conclusions, then, as are follows. First, George Eliot shows us that human character 
develops and changes according to our relations to and treatment by others. We are works in 
progress: dynamic and emergent. We can be made, or destroyed, by other people. There are 
always possibilities for transformation and growth, but they are shaped mostly by interperson-
al encounters, or our moral environment. One of the consequences of this position is that we 
should not draw firm conclusions about a person’s character or risk, or their trustworthiness/un-
trustworthiness, as if these are fixed, but should keep our minds open to the realities of change 
(Ashton, 2019; Williams & Liebling, submitted). Of course, we should also avoid wishful 
thinking and ‘comforting illusions’ (see Gatens, 2019, p. 238). Uncertainty and open-minded-
ness are necessary to our capacity for moral and intellectual judgment. More generally, George 
Eliot proposed that there is a moral reality to the universe. I find myself engaged in a long-term 
empirical project that strongly supports her case.
Secondly, the minds of others form part of this moral universe. Authors transform us 
too. Encounters with ideas – ‘the relations of one mind to another’ (Fleishman, 2011) – lead to 
discovery and the formation or expansion of identity. We found something like this in a recent 
study of the meaning and impact of Shared Reading in prison in which reading aloud in groups 
over time improved ratings on dimensions like ‘confidence and agency’ and ‘being myself’ 
(Liebling et al., 2021). The cultivation of sensibility and thinking in dialogue with other minds 
has value, whether those minds are writers or living companions. We can find love, recognition, 
companionship and the seeds for growth in books as well as in other people.
Thirdly, as criminologists, prison scholars, and human beings, we should be open to all 
that philosophy and literature have to offer. Saunders shows, in his ‘Four Russians’ study, how 
fiction ‘changes the way we think about ourselves’ (Saunders, 2021, p. 215):
Reading “Master and Man” we begin living it; the words disappear, and we 
find ourselves thinking not about word choice but about the decisions the char-
acters are making and decisions we have made, or might have to make some-
day, in our actual lives. (Saunders, 2021, p. 221)
When we are moved by an individual story, we understand the moral universe more 
clearly. Perhaps this is especially true of nineteenth century literature, ‘which told us about 
people’s emotions in staggering depth and revealed the most carefully hidden secrets of human 
nature’ (Altan, 2019, p. 175). Through feeling, and narrative, we grasp things; we pay ‘ethical 
attention’ (Nussbaum, 1990, p. iv). Drawing on George Eliot, I have argued before that: 
The significance of the particular and the careful consideration of the general 
are equally relevant to ‘faithful representation’. Human feeling is a chief agent 
of realist research. In other words, our emotions do not need to be reconciled 
with our so-called data. They constitute data. They require critical reflection 
and triangulation, and ‘faithful representation’, but not selective inattention.’ 
(Liebling, 1999a, pp. 162-163)
Something about the prison experience, brutal as it is, generates, or is soothed by, 
philosophical insight. Suffering, injustice and degradation are harms to be avoided, but they 
‘force the soul to cry out “why”’? (Weil, tr. Doering, 2012, p. 66). Talking about philosophy in 
prison draws out different, perhaps more existential, dimensions of the lived experience from 
‘standard’ accounts of needs and pains (words that can limit as well as invite). Philosophi-
cal dialogue encourages the cultivation of moral perception and sensitivity, or invites ‘moral 
imagination’ (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 45) in ways that can shape lives, both in and out of prison. 
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There is growing evidence from many studies of the positive effects of teaching philosophy and 
literature in prison (e.g. Szifris, 2021 and this volume).3 
Philosophy helps us to think, to know, and to live. We might encounter it through lit-
erature, philosophy classes, theatre, or other means (philosophical thinking underpins some 
cognitive behavioural courses, however lost that notion has become), with somewhat different 
meanings and effects, but however we encounter and engage with it, it helps us to test our as-
sumptions, tackle our distortions, affirm what is best in us, uncover meaning, and grow. Our 
cognitive, emotional and moral progress is intertwined (Goldstein, 2020). That people in prison 
often find philosophy inspiring and relevant tells us a great deal: there are ‘deep questions at 
stake’ (Carlisle, 2019, p. 599) which are relevant to our struggle to live manageable lives.
3 One of many fortunate events in my own journey – a key privilege of my professional teaching role 
– was encountering Kirstine Szifris and feeling excitement as her MPhil and PhD supervisor when she 
began to formulate her plan to teach philosophy in prison. I am delighted that she is now leading and 
publishing work in this field.
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